On forgiveness and reconciliation in post-conflict societies: a philosophical perspective

- Acerca do perdão e a reconciliação em sociedades pós-conflito: uma perspectiva filosófica
- Acerca del perdón y la reconciliación en sociedades post-conflicto: una perspectiva filosófica

Juan Manuel Jiménez Robles

Resumo: A Sabemos que vivemos em um mundo onde as pessoas se ferem entre elas e onde os conflitos armados são comuns, se reproduzindo inclusive depois de alcançar acordos de paz. Porém, também sabemos que temos a habilidade de perdoar e nos reconciliar quando foi cometida uma ofensa, ou seja, quando ocorre um ato imoral. Os processos de perdão e reconciliação são parte dessas habilidades humanas que nos permitem romper os ciclos de violência, e que concedem às vítimas a possibilidade de ser saradas e aos ofensores a opção de se reintegrar à suas comunidades. Estabelecer dinâmicas de perdão e reconciliação em cenários de pós-conflito dará lugar a sociedades mais pacíficas, onde a dignidade e os direitos de cada indivíduo são respeitados, e onde as pessoas são capazes de satisfazer suas necessidades, ao mesmo tempo que crescem e se desenvolvem como seres humanos.

1 PhD in 'International Studies in Peace, Conflict and Development', UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace, Jaume I University, Spain. Staff member of a non-governmental organisation, based in 'The Discovery Centre' in England, UK.

Abstract: We know we live in a world where people hurt each other, and where armed conflicts are commonplace, recurring quite often even after reaching peace agreements. Nevertheless, we also know we have the abilities to forgive and reconcile after wrongdoing has been committed, that means, after an immoral action has taken place. The processes of forgiveness and reconciliation are part of those human abilities which enable us to break the cycles of violence, and which allow victims to heal and perpetrators to be reintegrated into their communities. Establishing dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation in post-conflict settings will produce more peaceful societies, where the dignity and rights of each person are respected, and where people are able to fulfil their needs and grow and develop as human beings.

Key words: Forgiveness. Reconciliation. Armed conflicts. Repentance. Sustainable Peace

Resumen: Sabemos que vivimos en un mundo donde las personas se hieren entre ellas, y donde los conflictos armados son comunes, reproduciéndose incluso después de alcanzar acuerdos de paz. Sin embargo, también sabemos que tenemos la habilidad de perdonar y reconciliarnos cuando se ha cometido una ofensa, es decir, cuando ha tenido lugar un acto inmoral. Los procesos de perdón y reconciliación son parte de esas habilidades humanas que nos permiten romper los ciclos de violencia, y que conceden a las víctimas la posibilidad de ser sanadas y a los victimarios la opción de reintegrarse en sus comunidades. Establecer dinámicas de perdón y reconciliación en escenarios de post-conflicto dará lugar a sociedades más pacíficas, donde la dignidad y los derechos de cada individuo sean respetados, y donde las personas sean capaces de satisfacer sus necesidades, al mismo tiempo que crecen y se desarrollan como seres humanos.

Palabras clave: Decolonization. Human rights. Participation.

Introduction

A peaceful world implies peaceful societies, where the dignity of each human being is respected. Peace Studies researchers suggest, that only by living in a Culture of Peace human beings can grow and develop, or using the words of Professor of International Peacebuilding John Paul Lederach (2000, p. 49): “Firstly, peace is related with the right to dignity, the respect and minimum fulfilment of each person”, and further

In 1785 Immanuel Kant wrote Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, where he stated that human beings have and intrinsic dignity, which makes them worthy of honour. Inspired by Kant’s moral philosophy, the first article of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 says: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood".
Professor Lederach (2000, p. 72) adds: “we look for the human fulfilment, as much as possible”. Nevertheless we live in a world with different types of violence that undermine the peace we want and need. According to Norwegian author Johan Galtung (1969, 1990), these types of violence are: Direct violence (such as wars, killings or rapes), Structural violence (such as starvation or racism), and Cultural violence (support of direct or structural violence through different cultural aspects, such as religion, ideology, language or art). Sadly, we have to agree with Professor of Philosophy Peter van Inwagen (2008, p. 60) when he says: “evil is not an illusion”.

Armed conflicts are the most devastating forms of violence, and we should assume that the number of wars and human deaths associated to them haven’t decreased during the last years, as Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen (2015) showed in an article published in the *Journal of Peace Research*. Besides, Daniel Philpott (2012, p. 1) from Notre Dame University noticed that: “when a violent conflict ends, different studies show that after five years 43% of those conflicts result in violence as before”.

When armed conflicts are over, fighters go back to their homes, but their homes are not far away from their enemies homes, since currently most of the armed conflicts are intrastate3, as the main peace research sources show: Uppsala Conflict Data Program; The Correlates of War Project at the University of Michigan; The biennial Peace and Conflict Survey, produced at the University of Maryland (KALDOR, 2012). Therefore, it is not enough just to stop the armed conflicts, but we need to implement policies that help old enemies to forgive each other, and if possible even reconcile, in order to avoid falling into cycles of new violence when the old armed conflicts are over.

Establishing post-conflict dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation may help in fostering sustainable peace, since these processes can restore broken relationships caused by the action of violence. A comprehensive study carried out by William Long and Peter Brecke in 2003, which analyzed 430 armed conflicts in 109 countries during 50 years, showed that introducing reconciliation events4 after an armed conflict was over, helped to reduce the possibilities of violence recurring, compared with other situations where reconciliation events had not been introduced.

At the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace, we have been researching about human abilities for peace since 1999, and we think forgiveness and reconciliation are some of those abilities that could be helpful if they are implemented in post-war con-

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3 Intrastate armed conflicts are those between a government and a non-governmental party, with no interference from other countries. Other category includes intrastate armed conflicts with foreign involvement, those conflicts between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict (PETTERSSON; WALLENSTEEN, 2015).

4 For the purpose of their study, the authors (LONG; BRECKE, 2003, p. 6-7) defined a reconciliation event as one that included the following elements: “direct physical contact or proximity between opponents, usually senior representatives of respective factions; a public ceremony accompanied by substantial publicity or media attention that relays the event to the wider national society; and ritualistic or symbolic behaviour that indicates the parties consider the dispute resolved and that more amicable relations are expected to follow”.

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texts. As founder of the Chair, philosopher Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2015, p. 1) would say: “it is true that we can hurt each other, but it is also true that we can care for each other”. Therefore, after a hurtful action, we can forgive and reconcile if we want. In this vein, Irene Comins et al (2011, p. 119) say: “The analysis and reconstruction of our abilities for peace allow us to explain peace indicators”. These indicators may help us to walk towards a more peaceful future, therefore, following Irene Comins (2015, p. 38): “there is no excuse, peace is possible”.

We can teach and rebuild human abilities to make peace, starting from peace itself, since in the same way that we have learnt to make war, we can learn to make peace. Along the same lines, Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2005, p. 63) says:

We have intuitions as human beings, presentiments, traditions, we use metaphors, we narrate tales, etc. about what it would be to live in peace. It is not about learning peace because we know what peace is not, but it is about rebuilding the ways we make peace.

As we have said, there are evidences that show forgiveness and reconciliation help to avoid recurrence of violence after an armed conflict is over, and it seems that forgiveness is the entrance hall to reconciliation, therefore we will examine first the concept of forgiveness, before discussing some brief comments about the idea of reconciliation.

**On forgiveness**

During the last decades, researchers from different academic fields have been trying to understand the meaning and implications of forgiveness, since forgiveness places itself within the limits of disciplines such as Philosophy, Psychology, Politics, or Theology, among others. To define forgiveness is difficult, since there are different connotations and shades of meaning depending on the context of where the idea of forgiveness is used. Or looking to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s terminology, we could say forgiveness is uncircumscribed, that is, without definitive boundaries (BASH, 2015, p. 23).

We don’t have the space here to look at what all those disciplines of knowledge have to say about forgiveness, but we will outline what some philosophers say about it, doing an exercise of deconstruction. That means, we’ll think first about what forgiveness is **not**, in order to see what forgiveness is afterwards.

**What forgiveness is not**

• Forgiveness is not forgetting: when a person is hurt by another person, having some time to forgive is helpful, but if a victim leaves a very long time since they received the offence until they offer forgiveness, maybe they are forgetting rather than forgiving, as French philosopher Vladimir Jankélévitch pointed out in his book *Le Pardon* (1967). In other words, through the action of forgiveness, the past violence produced by the offender is not forgotten, but it’s remembered forgiven, and its memory doesn’t hurt anymore. Therefore, the victim can remember what happened, but not to use it against
the offender, but to prevent a violent situation like that to be repeated\textsuperscript{5}. As Miroslav Volf (2006) would say: “memory shouldn’t be a sword that produces a spiral of violence, but a shield to avoid past violence to recur”.

- Forgiveness is not excusing: when forgiveness is needy, it’s because there is at least a part of the offense that is inexcusable, which doesn’t mean that is unforgivable. Or using the words of former Professor of Cambridge University C. S. Lewis (WALMSLEY, 2002, p. 185):

Forgiveness says ‘Yes, you have done this thing, but I accept your apology, I will never hold it against you and everything between us two will be exactly as it was before.’ But excusing says ‘I see that you couldn’t help it or didn’t mean it, you weren’t really to blame.’ If one was not really to blame then there is nothing to forgive. In that sense forgiveness and excusing are almost opposites.

Therefore, when forgiveness is required, it’s because an inexcusable injustice has been committed, and it needs to be punished or forgiven\textsuperscript{6}, because just excusing an injustice would be morally wrong.

- Forgiveness is not obligatory: most philosophers would say forgiveness is not a moral obligation, but a moral virtue (HABER, 1991; KOLNAI, 1977), that means each victim should decide freely if they want to forgive the offender or not (MINOW, 1998, p. 17). As Paul Lauritzen (1987) would say: “it is best to treat forgiveness like certain forms of benevolence: praiseworthy but not required”. Even when the offender repents, the offering of forgiveness by the victim would be an optional virtue; nevertheless, in that situation we could argue forgiveness becomes a quasi-obligation (KOLNAI, 1977), that means, although forgiveness is never obligatory (philosophically speaking), if the wrongdoer repents, it could be almost obligatory for the victim to forgive them, but they have the last word to offer forgiveness or not.

- Forgiveness is not renouncing justice: when an immoral act is committed, an injustice is taking place, therefore something should be done in order to restore the moral order that has been broken. Punishment (ARENDT, 1958) or revenge (MINOW, 1998) would be the most natural ways to try to implement justice. On the other hand, forgiveness would be another option, although more demanding for the victim, since they have to assume the pain produced by the offender, not condoning the immoral act pretending that nothing had happened (KOLNAI, 1977)\textsuperscript{7}, but denouncing it to avoid its repetition, at the same time that they forgive the offender.

\textsuperscript{5} This reminds us the famous aphorism of Spanish philosopher George Santayana: “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.

\textsuperscript{6} As Hannah Arendt (1958) wrote: “men are unable to forgive what they cannot punish, and they are unable to punish what has turned out to be unforgivable”.

\textsuperscript{7} Philosopher and former rector at the University of Salamanca, Miguel de Unamuno, used to say: “Whoever forgives everything forgives nothing” (BRÅKENHIELM, 1993, p. 37).
What forgiveness is

Traditionally, it has been easier for philosophers to agree about what forgiveness is not than about what forgiveness is, therefore, some attempts to define forgiveness are mere descriptions of the implications or consequences of forgiveness rather than a definition. Nevertheless, some of these philosophical attempts to describe what happens when we forgive or when we are forgiven, may help us to understand somehow what forgiveness is. We will explore them below.

- Forgiveness is a gift: Forgiveness is a free gift the victim bestows upon the offender, since they can do nothing to earn it by themselves (BILBAO et al, 1999). If the victim decides to forgive, the offender will have the choice to accept the gift of forgiveness or to reject it, as they could do with any other gift. Although forgiveness is free, it is not cheap, because for the person who forgives there is a cost to pay, a cost that means allowing the harm received by the offender to be quelled.

- Forgiveness is the forswearing of resentment: when a victim is willing to forgive, they will start a process that will take them to give up their resentment towards their offender, that means, they will stop feeling anger in regards to the offender for their misconduct. This idea was suggested by bishop Joseph Butler in 1718 (BASH, 2015), and today it is supported by the main psychologists (ENRIGHT, 2001, 2012; McCULLOUGH 2008; WORTHINGTON, 2005, 2009) and philosophers (DIGESER, 2001, 2004; GRISWOLD, 2007; MURPHY, 2003; STRAWSON, 1980) that have been studying forgiveness recently.

- Forgiveness is an act of liberation from the past: when someone is hurt by someone else, their thoughts and feelings may become stagnant in the past immoral action, being very difficult for the victim to continue with a normal life. Forgiving their offender, will help the victim to integrate the offense into their life and keep moving with a renewed hope. As recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and chairman of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Desmond Tutu (1999, p. 272) writes: “Forgiving means abandoning your right to pay back the perpetrator in his own coin, but it is a loss that liberates the victim”. On the other hand, being forgiven liberates the offender too, as Hannah Arendt (1958) says: “Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover”.

- Forgiveness is betting on people: human beings are full of lights and shadows, we are capable of heroic acts, but under certain circumstances we can commit atrocities too. Being aware of this will help the victim to forgive their offender, since in the same way that the offender has committed an immoral act and needs to be forgiven, in a dif-

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8 Danish existentialist philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (MOORE, 2003) would say: “Forgiveness is never earned... Forgiveness is not to be paid for... and it cannot be paid for”.

9 According to American moral philosopher Joel Feinberg, “to resent someone... is not merely to dislike him, but to have a negative feeling toward him in virtue of something he has done” (HABER, 1991).

10 Butler actually writes that forgiveness is the forswearing of revenge, but in his analysis he explains that revenge would be a consequence of resentment, therefore, forswearing resentment would imply forswearing revenge too.
ferent occasion the victim may commit another immoral act and will need to be forgiven too. Jeffrie Murphy refers to this awareness as moral humility (MURPHY; HAMPTON, 1988, p. 32). In other words, everyone needs to be forgiven sooner or later, therefore it is advisable for all of us to be forgivers who give another opportunity to those who offend us. In this vein, it may be helpful to think that an offense doesn’t exhaust the value of the offender; that means, the offender is more than his offense.

**Some words about repentance**

Should the wrongdoer repent before the victim offers him forgiveness? Is it morally appropriate for a wrongdoer to be forgiven if he doesn’t show any signs of repentance? These are key questions in any process of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Most of philosophers (HABER, 1991; KOLNAI, 1977; MURPHY, 2003) would say it is immoral to forgive a wrongdoer if he doesn’t repent, because by doing so, we would be endorsing the immoral action for which the wrongdoer stands. But if the wrongdoer repents\(^\text{11}\), we are before a different picture, since “the wrongdoer is withdrawing his endorsement from his own immoral past behaviour, standing with the victim in condemning it” (MURPHY; HAMPTON, 1988, p. 26). Therefore, “by repenting, the wrongdoer can in some sense become a new person; that by repenting their deed, the person they were who committed the wrong is nothing more than a metaphysical shadow” (HABER, 1991: 96). At that point, being forgiven would be morally right.

Nevertheless, not all philosophers regard repentance as a necessity in order the victim may offer forgiveness to the wrongdoer. For example, Jacques Derrida (2001, p. 45) writes about unconditional forgiveness, which would be that one that doesn’t demand repentance. The political philosopher Jean Hampton says: “we should forgive in order to reform the wrongdoer; i.e., we should forgive, not because the wrongdoer has repented, but as a step toward bringing his repentance about, making it at least easier for him” (MURPHY; HAMPTON, 1988, p. 30). Finally, former Professor of Philosophy Trudy Govier (2002, p. 64), following the Kantian tradition of human worth, states as follows:

Continued anger and ill-will towards a wrongdoer presume that he is nothing more – and is worth nothing more – than his wrongful deeds and is incapable of moral transformation [...] On this account, a victim of wrongdoing has strong reasons to forgive a wrongdoer,

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\(^{11}\) English philosopher Peter Strawson (1980, p. 6) wrote: “To ask to be forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude displayed in our action was such as might be properly be resented and in part to repudiate that attitude for the future (or at least for the immediate future); and to forgive is to accept the repudiation and to forswear the resentment”. We resent the evil actions more than the evil attitudes to do those actions; moreover, if we are not aware of evil attitudes or bad intentions, and those are not displayed in actions, we wouldn’t have anything to resent.

\(^{12}\) Analytic philosopher Michael Rea, discusses about the topic of change and personal identity in his book *Metaphysics: the basics* (2014, p. 111-121), where he addresses the nature of persons, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for survival or sameness of person over time. Studying these issues may be helpful to understand under what circumstances someone becomes a new person.
reasons independent of the wrongdoer’s acknowledgment and remorse. Those reasons are ethical, stemming from respect for persons, and prudential, stemming from the desirability of liberation from bitterness and an enhanced ability to move forward in life.

What should we say then? I think the victim can forgive their wrongdoer independently of their repentance, because if that is not the case, the wrongdoer would hold the power to decide when the victim may fade their resentment, allowing the wrongdoer to keep their victim in a sort of mental distress as long as they want. However, that’s not the case, since the victim has the power and authority to decide by themselves when they want to forgive, in order that their resentment fades, so they may be set free from their mental distress, stepping out of their victimhood and becoming a survivor.

On the other hand, in the same way the victim is free to forgive or not forgive their offender, the offender is free to accept or reject the offering of forgiveness by their victim, if forgiveness is offered to them. The victim cannot force their offender to be forgiven if they don’t want to. And it seems, the way the offender could be forgiven (if they want), would be by accepting the gift of forgiveness through the acknowledgment of their misdeed. Metaphorically speaking, we could say the gift of forgiveness is effective in the wrongdoer, when he accepts the accusation and forgiveness for his misdeed, by extending his hands in repentance. Or using the words of Miroslav Volf (2005, p. 153):

What does it mean to receive forgiveness, then? It means to receive both the accusation and the release from the debt. How do we receive release from debt? We simply believe and rejoice in gratitude for the generous gift. But how do we receive the accusation? By confessing our offence and repenting of it. By confessing, I recognize myself as the one who needs forgiveness and who can appropriately receive it. By failing to confess, I declare that I am in no need of forgiveness. To me, in that case, forgiveness isn’t a gift; it’s an insult, a declaration that I’ve done the wrong I claim not to have done.

Another question would be if the offender can be forgiven through a sincere repentance, in the absence of the offering of forgiveness by their victim. In that situation, if the offender has repented, and they have done everything in their hand to restore their victim, but even then their victim doesn’t want to forgive them, the offender may turn to the forgiveness of family members of the victim (secondary victims), the society (tertiary victims), or divine forgiveness (if they believe in God). These secondary and tertiary victims (GOVIER, 2002) could bestow some kind of forgiveness upon the offender, in order to release them partly of the weight of their past offense, which would help them with their own forgiveness (self-forgiveness), so they may continue with their life as normal as possible.
Final words on reconciliation

We have said forgiveness is the entrance hall to reconciliation, that’s the same that saying the expected teleology of any process of forgiveness would be reconciliation. Nevertheless, the forgiver may choose not to step into the main hall to be reconciled with their offender, something advisable to do if the offender doesn’t repent their immoral action, since it could be dangerous for the victim to reconcile then.

On the other hand, the offender may be forgiven from their immoral action and still choose not to reconcile with their victim, for example: a sexual offender may be forgiven by their victim, nevertheless they don’t feel restored from their abusive tendency, and they are afraid to harm their victim again, therefore they choose not to reconcile, so they walk a different path to their victim. In other words, unlike forgiveness, for reconciliation to happen, both victim and offender need to agree. As Walter Wink would say: “forgiveness can be unilateral, while reconciliation is always mutual” (APPLEBY, 2000, p. 197).

Going back to our starting point, we said that establishing post-conflict dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation after an armed conflict, may help to fostering sustainable peace. We have said forgiveness and reconciliation are human abilities for peace. We have seen some elements of forgiveness, but what is reconciliation? In the context we are talking about, reconciliation “is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future” (BLOOMFIELD et al., 2003, p. 12). And as Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin (2007, p. xiii) say: “We believe that reconciliation has enormous potential to help nascent and divided nations maneuver through the rocky shoals of political transition”.

A reconciliation process seeks the reestablishment of broken relations, knowing that if we want lasting peace, we need former enemies to relate adequately, because in the same way that past violent relations were the platform to sustain the violent conflict, respectful and constructive relations in the present will be the platform to sustain a peaceful future (LEDERACH, 1998, 2014).

No doubt a reconciliation process will be facilitated if there is a successful forgiveness process beforehand. But, would it be possible to have real reconciliation without forgiveness? I would suggest that would imply a weak version of reconciliation, where former enemies just agree to coexist without killing each other. Nevertheless, from this paper we are supporting a strong version of reconciliation, preceded by forgiveness, which aims at a sustainable peace based not only in the absence of direct violence, but also in the absence of structural violence, which implies the presence of social justice.

When the fighting finishes, it’s not enough to continue as before the fighting started, but issues of structural injustice should be addressed in order to avoid returning to violence, and the best position to address these issues is from a point of reconciliation, from where the old warring parties relate adequately and build a new future together for their communities and countries. Mutual forgiveness will be helpful for this enterprise, since forgiveness opens the doors to reconciliation, which is the best platform for achieving sustainable peace. As John Paul Lederach (2005, p. 76) says: “the center of building
sustainable justice and peace is the quality and nature of people’s relationships”. In other words, human security and peace shouldn’t depend on the quality of our weapons, but on the quality of our relations.

In that line of thought, we could say that if we want to avoid new cycles of violence, after a violent conflict is over, promoting politics of reconciliation will be a pragmatic thing to do. As David Bloomfield says (BLOOMFIELD et al, 2003, p. 11-12):

Positive working relationships generate the atmosphere within which governance can thrive, while negative relations will work to undermine even the best system of governance. Reconciliation, though not easy, is the most effective way to address those relations [...] Reconciliation is not a luxury, or an add-on to democracy. Reconciliation is an absolute necessity.

But apart from the pragmatic reasons, reconciliation is also a moral enterprise to be pursued by those who have been enemies, since fostering reconciliation means taking into account human dignity.

We could also say there is something vocational for humans about seeking reconciliation, something to do with who we are and the purpose we have on earth. Along these lines we read: “something resonates deeply in the human soul about the need to find our way towards healthier human relationships” (LEDERACH; LEDERACH, 2010, p. 4). It seems to be more primary or basic, living in peace and harmony with our fellow humans that fighting them. People loving each other and caring for their neighbours is something pragmatic, moral, and even vocational to do. Philosopher Glen Pettigrove, addresses some of these ideas in his book Forgiveness and Love (2012), saying that when we love, we are more open to offer forgiveness. And now we know that once forgiveness has been offered and received, reconciliation and sustainable peace can be brought to life.

Conclusion

When an intrastate armed conflict is over, different studies show that after five years almost half of those conflicts result in violence as before, producing a spiral of violence which is difficult to stop. Forgiveness and reconciliation are before us as human abilities for peace that allow victims to heal and perpetrators to be reintegrated into their communities. Facilitating post-conflict dynamics of forgiveness and reconciliation may be helpful for promoting sustainable peace, restoring human relationships, and bringing to an end the spiral of violence.

In this regard, we have seen that forgiveness is not forgetting, it’s not excusing, it’s not obligatory, and it’s not renouncing to justice. On the other hand, forgiveness is a gift, it’s the forswearing of resentment, it’s an act of liberation from the past, and it’s betting on people.
In this article we also highlighted that it is victims’ prerogative to forgive or not, independently of the presence or absence of signs of repentance on the offenders side.

And finally, we pointed to reconciliation, as the expected teleology of any process of forgiveness. If we want lasting peace after an armed conflict ends, we need former enemies to relate adequately, since respectful and constructive relations will be the safest way to build a peaceful future for a society, where human security won’t be based in the quality of our weapons but in the quality of our relations as human beings.

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JUAN MANUEL JIMÉNEZ ROBLES
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